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CLAUSES: THE AVERAGE CONSUMER’S 
EXPERIENCE 
LINDA J. DEMAINE* AND DEBORAH R. HENSLER** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Private arbitration, enabled by predispute agreements whereby parties 
waive their rights to resolve future disputes in a public courtroom, has a long 
history in the United States.1  Until recently, arbitration reigned in two domains: 
commercial transactions and labor-management relations.  Businesspersons 
generally chose arbitration over litigation for several reasons.  First, they 
preferred to select the people who would decide their disputes, often opting for 
decisionmakers with relevant expertise, rather than having courts assign 
generalist judges to their cases.  Second, they tended to prefer resolutions based 
on commercial norms rather than legal standards that might be less appropriate 
for their disputes.  Finally, they commonly anticipated that resolution by 
arbitration would be quicker and cheaper than court resolution, with its 
potential for protracted pretrial adversarialism, extensive discovery, and multi-
ple appeals. 
Labor unions and management included arbitration provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements for different, albeit overlapping, reasons.  Both labor 
and management believed that resolving disputes through arbitration would 
minimize industrial conflict over worker grievances.  They had more confidence 
in decisionmakers whom they selected from their own ranks than court-
appointed judges from outside the affected industries.  Furthermore, they 
wanted a conflict resolution process that would keep businesses running and 
avoid losses in productivity and employment.  In both the commercial and 
labor-management domains, arbitration agreements were negotiated by sophis-
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 1. See Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928). 
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ticated parties of approximately equivalent bargaining power who understood 
the benefits and costs of their bargains.2 
Over the past several decades, as a result of some remarkable lawmaking by 
federal and state appellate courts, the profile of arbitration has changed dra-
matically.3  Arbitration is no longer the province of sophisticated participants.  
Instead, individuals pursuing long-established statutory claims, such as those 
brought under the federal securities4 and antitrust laws,5 and newer but long-
sought civil rights claims, including race, sex, age,6 and disability discrimination,7 
may now be forced to arbitrate if the parties are deemed to have assented to a 
predispute arbitration clause.8  Consumer claims have followed a similar course, 
such that consumers who enter into contracts that substitute binding arbitration 
for the public court system may be required to arbitrate disputes that arise in 
the course of their relationships with service or product providers.9 
The merits of this consumer arbitration jurisprudence have been debated 
heatedly by members of the judiciary, legal commentators, commercial inter-
ests, and public advocacy groups.  Perhaps most central to the debate are con-
cerns that consumers do not fully understand the terms of these agreements,10 
and that, even if they did, they cannot negotiate those terms, which are offered 
on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.11  In accordance with the current arbitration 
jurisprudence, however, consumers are bound by the terms of these contracts 
 
 2. For the history of commercial and labor-management arbitration in the United States, see 
BRUCE BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE (1990); ROBERT 
COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (4th ed. 1991); William Jones, 
Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193; 
Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 FLA. L. 
REV. 557 (1983). 
 3. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“There is little doubt that the Court’s interpretation of the [Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)] has given 
it a scope far beyond the expectations of the Congress that enacted it.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 5. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 6. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  The issue in Gilmer was 
age discrimination, but the language used by the Court would apply equally to race and sex discrimina-
tion.  Specifically, as Congress did not “evince[] an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies 
for the statutory rights at issue,” id. at 26, in either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§2000e (2000), or the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), the same rule would be expected to apply to claims brought under 
these statutes. 
 7. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
 8. For a discussion of general trends in the expansion of mandatory arbitration beyond the com-
mercial realm, see Jean Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Man-
datory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
831 (2002). 
 9. On the expansion of mandatory arbitration into consumer contracts, see Katherine Stone, Rus-
tic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999). 
 10. See, e.g., Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 281, 284 (2002); Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 190 (2003). 
 11. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Con-
sumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 76. 
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unless their terms are deemed unconscionable or otherwise faulty under general 
principles of contract law.12 
The debate surrounding consumer arbitration has lacked a strong empirical 
foundation.  For example, although it is generally believed that predispute arbi-
tration clauses in consumer contracts have become ubiquitous during the last 
decade,13 discussions of the extent to which consumers are exposed to arbitra-
tion clauses have been driven by headline cases, investigations of specific indus-
tries, and broader, unsystematic searches.14  Also lacking is systematic informa-
tion regarding the features of the arbitrations that are required by these clauses, 
and what consumers are told about these features.  Without such information, it 
is impossible to determine whether arbitration is simply another forum in which 
parties can freely pursue their legal rights, as the Supreme Court has held,15 or 
whether consumers’ rights are being negatively and substantively affected with-
out their true knowledge or consent. 
The purpose of this Article is to help build the empirical foundation neces-
sary for an informed debate regarding arbitration clauses in consumer contracts 
by providing preliminary insight into how businesses’ use of these clauses 
affects consumers’ ability to pursue their legal rights.  To this end, the Article 
reports the results of a study investigating, in a wide variety of consumer pur-
chases, the frequency with which the average consumer encounters arbitration 
clauses, the key provisions of these clauses, and the implications of these clauses 
for consumers who subsequently have disputes with the businesses they 
patronize. 
 
 12. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (stating that, pursuant to the 
Federal Arbitration Act, written provisions for arbitration are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”) (quoting 9 
U.S.C. §2). 
 13. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 119 (1992); 
M.D. Donovan & D.A. Searles, Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers: How to Combat Over-
reaching Arbitration Clauses, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 269, 269 (1998). 
 14. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institu-
tions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995); Stephanie 
Armour, Consumers in Bind? Clauses Require Arbitration, Bar Lawsuits, USA TODAY, Nov. 27, 1998, 
at 6B; Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at A1; 
Michael G. Wagner, Private Judges Arbitrate More Consumer Suits, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at 3. 
 15. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“By 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the 
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”). 
DEMAINE_GLOBAL.FMT.DOC 10/14/2004  10:17 AM 
58 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:55 
II 
METHODOLOGY 
Data from the 1999 Annual Demographic Survey (March Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) Supplement),16 published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and the Bureau of the Census, were used to create a statistical profile of the 
average U.S. consumer.  We grouped the CPS data by age (18 to 34, 35 to 54, 
and over 55), gender, race (white, black, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Native 
American/Eskimo), and family income (below median, above median).  The 
most populated cell, which accounted for approximately 11% of the U.S. 
population, was comprised of white males, aged 35 to 54, with above median 
incomes.  We assigned these characteristics to our average U.S. consumer,17 
whom we affectionately termed “Joe,” and placed him in Los Angeles, Califor-
nia.18 
We selected the industries from which Joe made purchases on the basis of 
two criteria.  First, we used the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s Consumer Expen-
diture Survey to identify the categories of potential industries into which Joe’s 
purchases would fall.19  Within these categories, we selected for study industries 
from which Joe would make “important” purchases, which we defined as pur-
chases that are expensive, ongoing, or have a potentially large impact on his life.  
Table 1 lists the categories and industries studied.  In total, thirty-seven indus-
tries were included. 
 
 16. These data are available at http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/ads/1999/sdata.htm (last revised Sept. 
30, 1999). 
 17. We identified the average U.S. consumer to have an objective basis for deciding which catego-
ries of purchases to consider and to maximize the generalizability of the study’s results.  An analysis of 
the data reveals that 83.2% of the purchases attributed to Joe were from businesses that cater to the 
average consumer, 11.2% were from businesses catering to those of high socioeconomic status (SES), 
and 5.6% were from businesses catering to individuals of low SES.  While the sample sizes are small, 
the findings suggest that businesses catering to high SES individuals are the most likely to use arbitra-
tion clauses (50.0%), followed by those catering to the average consumer (35.1%) and, finally, those 
catering to low SES individuals (11.1%). 
 18. We placed Joe in a precise geographic location to identify his purchases.  We chose Los Ange-
les for both substantive and practical reasons.  First, Los Angeles is the second largest metropolitan 
area in the United States, consisting of a diverse conglomeration of businesses.  Second, RAND is 
located there, which facilitated data collection.  Whether these results would replicate in other geo-
graphic locations is a question for future study.  Differences between the California legal environment 
and that of other states may cause businesses to behave differently.  However, given that 81.4% of the 
businesses surveyed operate both outside and inside California, and that a smaller percentage of the 
California-only businesses used arbitration clauses (16.7%) than did the businesses that operate outside 
and inside the state (39.7%), the results may generalize fairly well to other states, to the extent that 
interstate businesses do not vary the use and content of arbitration clauses by state. 
 19. These categories consisted of food and alcohol, housing, apparel and services, transportation, 
health care, entertainment, personal-care products and services, and personal insurance.  See BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN 2000 (Apr. 2002), avail-
able at http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxann00.pdf. 
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TABLE 1: 
INDUSTRIES SELECTED FOR STUDY 
 
Category Industry 
Housing and 
Home Services 
Home Repair/Remodeling; Home Protection; Home-
owners’ Insurance; Apartment Rental;  
Renters’ Insurance; Moving; Real Estate; Long Dis-
tance Telephone Service; 
Internet Service  
Retail Services Department Store; Online Retail 
Transportation Auto Purchase/Lease; Gas Card; Auto Insurance; Auto Repair/Maintenance 
Health Hospital; Health Care Provider; 
Health Insurance; Health Club 
Food and Enter-
tainment 
Grocery Store; Restaurant; Theme Park; Cul-
tural/Sports Event 
Travel Airline; Auto Rental; Hotel; Travel Agent; Tour Operator 
Financial 
Credit Card-General; Credit Card-Airline; Credit Card-
Department Store; Banking; Investment; Account-
ant/Tax Consultant 
Other Attorney; Cell Phone; Life Insurance 
 
The goal of the study was to investigate the arbitration policies of the busi-
nesses Joe was most likely to patronize.  Our three-tiered sampling strategy for 
identifying Joe’s purchases within the selected industries was therefore pur-
posive, rather than strictly random.  When Scarborough Research data were 
available for a selected industry,20 they served as the criterion for sampling 
businesses within that industry.  Scarborough data were available for the fol-
lowing industries: auto purchase/lease, auto insurance, health insurance, airline, 
auto rental, hotel, department store, Internet service, long distance telephone 
service, cell phone, general credit card, airline-affiliated credit card,21 depart-
ment store–affiliated credit card, banking, grocery store, restaurant, and theme 
park.  When Scarborough data were not available for a selected industry, but 
the industry was dominated by a few businesses, we gathered information from 
those dominant businesses.22  The following industries fit this profile: life insur-
 
 20. Scarborough Research is a company that collects data on consumer purchases in selected mar-
kets throughout the United States.  The Scarborough data used in this study relate the frequency with 
which individuals in the Los Angeles area with Joe’s demographic characteristics make purchases from 
businesses within particular industries. 
 21. Businesses in this industry are assumed to be the same as those in the airline industry. 
 22. Whether an industry was dominated by a few businesses was determined by a combination of 
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ance, homeowners’ and renters’ insurance, travel, tour, moving, home protec-
tion, auto repair/maintenance, gas card, health club, real estate, hospital, and 
investment.  In the absence of both Scarborough data and industry domination 
by a small number of businesses, we randomly sampled businesses within the 
selected industries.  Industries falling within this category include home 
repair/remodeling, apartment rental, health care, accounting/tax consulting, 
attorney/law, on-line retail, and cultural/sports events. 
When Scarborough data were used, five businesses were sampled within 
each industry, with the exception of the long distance telephone service (three 
sampled)23 and general credit card (two sampled) 24 industries.  When industries 
were dominated by a small number of businesses, we sampled those dominant 
businesses up to a maximum of five, with the exceptions of home protection 
(one missing), investment (one missing), hospitals (two missing), travel agents 
(three missing),25 and real estate agents (three missing).26  Finally, when busi-
nesses were randomly sampled, five were sampled within each industry, with 
the exception of attorneys (three sampled).  In all, we identified 167 businesses 
for study and obtained information on use of arbitration clauses from 161 of 
those.27  The data were collected in 2001 and reflect contract language for that 
year. 
The data reported in this Article were not easily collected.  Many businesses 
were not willing to participate in the study, although they were informed that 
the data would be reported en masse without revealing businesses’ names; 
others would not provide information even when the authors inquired in the 
role of potential consumers.  For many clauses, the authors sought assistance 
from third parties who had retained their paperwork from recent purchases.  
For others, the authors purchased products or services.  For example, one 
coauthor acquired four credit cards while conducting the study, as that was the 
only means by which to obtain the clauses used by these businesses.  Even when 
businesses were legally bound to provide the information, it was not always as 
 
industry data and physical presence in the Los Angeles area. 
 23. The fourth long distance company refused to participate, and information on its use of arbitra-
tion clauses was otherwise unavailable. 
 24. Excluding credit cards available through multiple sources, such as Visa and MasterCard, the 
general credit card sample was limited to two companies. 
 25. Although only two large travel agencies were surveyed, neither used an arbitration clause, and 
both reported that travel agents in the area do not use them.  Accordingly, any arbitration clause 
applying to the consumer as a result of patronizing a travel agency would result from the tour opera-
tor’s contract. 
 26. Only two very large brokers were surveyed; however, both used the same form arbitration 
agreement and reported that the form is used statewide within the industry. 
 27. In four contexts, single businesses were sampled multiple times: (1) airlines were sampled once 
for their use of arbitration clauses in airline tickets and again for airline-affiliated credit cards; (2) 
department stores were sampled once for their use of arbitration clauses for store purchases and again 
for store credit cards; (3) the businesses sampled for auto, life, homeowners’, and renters’ insurance 
overlap substantially; and (4) the businesses sampled for Internet, long distance telephone, and cellular 
telephone service overlap to a lesser extent.  The total number of businesses sampled (161) reflects 
these businesses being counted as one business each time they were sampled.  The total number of 
independent businesses sampled is 138. 
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readily available as one might expect.  The following exchange between one 
coauthor and a long distance telephone service provider is illustrative: 
Dear Customer Service Personnel, 
I hope you can help me with the following question, as both my fiancé and I have asked 
it of you more than once during the last few months and have received no answer.  Spe-
cifically, we are wondering if an arbitration clause applies to our account.  That is, is 
there a clause that specifies that any dispute between us and [Company] has to be 
resolved in arbitration rather than in court?  Neither one of us is displeased with our 
[Company] service, except for the failure to answer this question.  We’ve asked the 
question because I’m doing some research on dispute resolution. 
Thank you. 
Linda Demaine 
Dear Ms. Demaine, 
Thank you for contacting [Company] e-Customer Service.  In regards to your . . . e-
mail, [Company] does not participate in any arbitrary disputes. 
[Company] is committed to ensuring you make the most of your service.  If you have 
any additional questions or concerns, please visit On-line Account Manager at [Com-
pany URL]. 
Sincerely, 
Melissa ______ 
e-Customer Service 
Dear Melissa, 
Thank you for your statement that [Company] does not participate in any arbitrary dis-
putes. . . . My question did not address “arbitrary disputes,” but, rather, “arbitration 
clauses.”  Again, I would like to know if an arbitration clause applies to my residential 
long distance account.  Thank you. 
Linda Demaine 
Dear Ms. Demaine, 
Thank you for contacting [Company] e-Customer Service. 
In response to your e-mail, please reply with what the difference [sic] between an arbi-
trary dispute and an arbitration clause so we can better answer your question. 
[Company] is committed to ensuring you make the most of your service.  If you have 
any additional questions or concerns, please visit On-line Account Manager at [Com-
pany URL]. 
Sincerely, 
Michelle _____ 
e-Customer Service28 
 
 28. The coauthor involved in this exchange subsequently explained the difference between arbi-
trary disputes and arbitration clauses to the customer service representative and was informed that no 
arbitration clause applied to her account. 
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These data-collection challenges are also likely to be faced by consumers 
who attempt to learn about businesses’ use of arbitration clauses. 
III 
RESULTS 
Across the industries studied, fifty-seven of the 161 sampled businesses 
(35.4%) included arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts.  (See Table 
2.)29  The prevalence of arbitration clauses is highest (69.2%) in the financial 
category (credit cards, banking, investment, and accounting/tax consulting), and 
lowest (0) in the food and entertainment category (grocery stores, restaurants, 
theme parks, and cultural/sports events).  This pattern is not surprising, as the 
financial category is characterized by industries that rely heavily on written con-
tracts, often for ongoing services, whereas the food and entertainment category 
is characterized by industries that engage in isolated transactions with no writ-
ten contract between businesses and consumers.  A similar pattern holds to 
some extent across industries.  The auto insurance and health insurance indus-
tries, for example—both of which typically provide ongoing services under writ-
ten contract—are more likely to require arbitration than are the auto 
repair/maintenance and health-care–provider industries.  This pattern is not 
universal, however.  For example, none of the home protection companies and 
only one health club surveyed required arbitration, although consumers usually 
contract in writing for these ongoing services.30  Customary practice and indus-
try regulations likely explain some of the patterns found. 
 
 29. The auto, homeowners’, and renters’ insurance contracts referred to “appraisal” rather than 
“arbitration.”  They are included in the results because, under California law, agreements to appraise 
are treated as agreements to arbitrate.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280(a) (2003) (“‘Agreement’ [as 
used in this title] includes but is not limited to agreements providing for valuations, appraisals and 
similar proceedings .  .  .  .”). 
 30. Overall, 55.1% of businesses that offer an ongoing product or service and use a written contract 
included an arbitration clause, whereas only 9.4% of businesses that provide a one-time product or 
service without a written contract did so. 
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TABLE 2: 
PREVALENCE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES, BY INDUSTRY 
 
Category 
Number of 
Businesses 
Sampled 
Number Using 
Arbitration 
Clause 
Percentage 
Using Arbitra-
tion Clause 
Housing and Home Services 
Home Repair/Remodeling 
Home Protection 
Homeowners’ Insurance 
Apartment Rental 
Renters’ Insurance 
Moving 
Real Estate 
Long Distance Service 
Internet Service 
35
5
3
4
5
4
4
2
3
5
13
2
0
4
1
3
0
2
0
1
37.1
Retail Services 
Department Store 
Online Retail 
 10
5
5
 3
0
3
30.0
Transportation 
Auto Purchase/Lease 
Auto Repair/Maintenance 
Gas Card 
Auto Insurance 
 20
5
5
5
5
 10
1
0
4
5
50.0
Health Care 
Hospital 
Health Care Provider 
Health Insurance 
Health Club 
 17
2
5
5
5
 6
0
0
5
1
35.3
Food & Entertainment 
Grocery Store 
Restaurant 
Theme Park 
Cultural/Sports Event 
 20
5
5
5
5
 0
0
0
0
0
0
Travel 
Airline 
Auto Rental 
Hotel 
Travel Agent 
Tour Operator 
 22
5
5
5
2
5
 3
0
0
0
0
3
13.6
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Financial 
Credit Card - General 
Credit Card - Airline 
Credit Card - Store 
Banking 
Investments 
Accountant/Tax Consultant 
 26
2
5
5
5
4
5
 18
2
4
3
3
4
2
69.2
Other 
Attorney 
Cellular Telephone 
Life Insurance 
11
3
5
3
4
2
2
0
36.4
Total 161 57 35.4
 
Of the fifty-seven businesses sampled that use arbitration clauses in their 
consumer contracts, we obtained clauses from fifty-two.31  We analyzed the main 
features of each of these clauses, focusing on those features that are most likely 
to determine consumers’ understanding of arbitration and its implications for 
the resolution of disputes with a business, and on those with the greatest 
potential to influence consumers’ ability to pursue or defend a claim against a 
business. 
A. Scope of Arbitration Clause 
In reviewing the scope of the arbitration clauses, we focused on four dimen-
sions: (1) the subject matter of the disputes covered; (2) any provision for the 
consumer or the business to seek interim relief from a court prior to an arbitra-
tion decision; (3) any exemption of small claims actions from the arbitration 
requirement; and (4) any preclusion of class actions within required arbitra-
tions. 
1. Subject Matter of Dispute 
Thirty-four of the fifty-two arbitration clauses (65.4%) apply to all disputes 
that arise under the contract.  Fifteen of these (28.8%) explicitly reach beyond 
the contract in some manner, sometimes in multiple ways.  Nine of the clauses 
apply to prior agreements between the business and the consumer, and an addi-
tional two apply to at least some preexisting disputes between the consumer 
and the business (regardless of whether there was a prior agreement between 
the consumer and business).  Nine of the clauses apply to relationships that 
result from the agreement.  One clause applies to related purchases.  Four apply 
to any dispute between the business and the consumer, and one applies to 
“[a]ny subject matter whatsoever.”  In addition, many of the clauses do not con-
strain themselves to disputes between the consumer and the business, and thus 
 
 31. The missing clauses are as follows: health insurance (3), home repair/remodeling (1), and 
homeowners’ insurance (1). 
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may be interpreted to apply to third parties who are not signatories to the 
agreement. 
The remaining eighteen clauses (34.6%) apply only to certain classes of dis-
putes.  An Internet service provider and a cell phone company exempt disputes 
involving the consumer’s failure to pay billed charges.  An apartment lessor’s 
clause applies only to personal injury and property damage claims (thus 
exempting unlawful detainer actions).  The two real estate brokers exempt 
numerous actions, including foreclosure proceedings, unlawful detainer actions, 
and matters within the jurisdiction of a probate or bankruptcy court.  Eleven 
insurance clauses cover only disputes regarding the amount the insured is enti-
tled to recover, sometimes under a particular section of the policy.  An account-
ant limits the clause’s application to fee disputes in divorce cases.  And an 
attorney states that the clause applies only to claims concerning the perform-
ance of services. 
2.  Provision for Interim Relief 
Ten of the fifty-two clauses (19.2%) provide for some form of interim relief 
from a court, including injunction, sequestration, attachment, garnishment, 
repossession, replevin, appointment of a receiver, or any other provisional rem-
edy relating to “any collateral security or property interests for contractual 
debts owed by either party to the other under the agreement.”  Eight of these 
clauses state that the provisional remedy may be exercised by either the con-
sumer or the business, whereas two allow for only the business to do so. 
3.  Small Claims Exception 
Sixteen of the fifty-two clauses (30.8%) exempt small claims from the arbi-
tration requirement.  Half of these clauses state that either party may pursue an 
action in small claims court; the other half state that the business will refrain 
from invoking the clause if the consumer pursues an action in small claims 
court.32 
4.   Class Action Preclusion 
Sixteen of the fifty-two arbitration clauses (30.8%) explicitly prohibit class 
actions within the arbitration proceeding, and none of the remaining clauses 
explicitly provide for class actions. 
The claims covered by the clauses are summarized in Table 3. 
 
 32. This exclusion may reflect a considered judgment by businesses that, however inexpensive or 
expeditious arbitration may be, it will nevertheless require more time and resources than resolving a 
dispute in small claims court.  Whatever the actual transaction-cost differences may be, businesses do 
not face significant exposure in small claims courts.  See Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, 
Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 219, 
235-43, 247-54 (1975); see also Susan Raitt et al., The Use of Mediation in Small Claims Courts, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 55, 1 & n.11 (1993). 
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TABLE 3: 
SCOPE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSE 
 
Claims Covered Number Percent 
All claims arising under contract 34 65.4 
Claims beyond immediate contract 15 28.8 
Provision for interim relief 10 19.2 
Small claims exemption 16 30.8 
Class action preclusion 16 30.8 
B. Notice that Consumer is Waiving Right to Court 
Twenty-nine of the fifty-two clauses (55.8%) state that consumers are 
waiving their right to resolve a dispute through the court system.  (See Table 4.)  
Two additional clauses (3.8%) state only that consumers are giving up the right 
to a jury trial, and another (1.9%) simply states that consumers are giving up 
the right to proceed in any other forum.  The remaining twenty clauses (38.5%) 
are silent on what rights consumers are waiving.33 
 
TABLE 4: 
NOTICE TO CONSUMER 
 
Waiving Right to . . .  Number Percent 
Court 29 55.8 
Jury trial 2 3.8 
Any other forum 1 1.9 
No mention that consumer is waiving right 20 38.5 
 
C. Providers and Rules of Arbitration 
The U.S. Supreme Court and state supreme courts have interpreted arbitra-
tion statutes to allow contracting parties to decide what rules should govern 
arbitration proceedings, subject only to the general proviso that arbitrators 
must be unbiased and uncorrupted.34  Consequently, arbitration clauses may 
vary greatly in the amount of information they convey to consumers about what 
arbitration is or what consumers can expect if they participate in an arbitration.  
In the present study, we focused on the following fundamental points regarding 
 
 33. This silence is puzzling given the holding by the California Court of Appeals, in Badie v. Bank 
of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998), that “to be enforceable, a contractual waiver of the 
right to a jury trial ‘must be clearly apparent in the contract[,] and its language must be unambiguous 
and unequivocal, leaving no room for doubt as to the intention of the parties.’”  Id. at 289 (quoting 
Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 885 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
 34. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 479 (1989); 
Ebasco Constrs. v. Ahtna, 932 P.2d 1312 (Alaska 1997); Moncharsch v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 
(Cal. 1992). 
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arbitration providers and rules of arbitration: (1) which organization will pro-
vide the arbitration; (2) the qualifications of the arbitrators; (3) the method for 
selecting the arbitrators; and (4) the rules of procedure governing the arbitra-
tion. 
1. Providers and Rules Generally 
Thirty-six of the fifty-two clauses (69.2%) designate the entity that will con-
duct the arbitration.  (See Table 5.)35  Twenty-nine of these clauses designate a 
single entity as the arbitration provider: nineteen specify the American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA), five specify the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), 
two specify JAMS, two investment companies designate the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD), and one health insurer names a local law 
firm.  Seven additional clauses provide for a choice by the party initiating the 
arbitration among two or more possible providers: six allow the party to choose 
between two or more of the aforementioned providers, and one investment 
company offers the NASD or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), unless 
the consumer prefers the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. 
Fourteen of the clauses that specify an arbitration provider also specify the 
rules that will govern the arbitration proceeding, such as the AAA Commercial 
Arbitration Rules or the AAA Wireless Industry Association Rules.  In other 
cases in which a provider organization is specified, the organization’s consumer  
or other applicable rules presumably would govern.36 Seven of these clauses 
address the implications of a conflict between the clause and the arbitration 
provider’s rules.  Each of these clauses states that, in the event of a conflict 
between the two, the arbitration clause will govern. 
Sixteen clauses (30.8%) are silent on both who will conduct the arbitration 
and what rules will apply. 
 
 35. A few companies specified that a particular provider’s rules would be used but did not explic-
itly designate a provider.  These companies are treated as having specified the provider whose rules 
they designated. 
 36. The health insurance clause that designates a particular law office as arbiter states that the gov-
erning rules of procedure are developed by the law office, in conjunction with the business and an advi-
sory committee. 
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TABLE 5: 
SPECIFICATION OF ARBITRATION PROVIDER 
 
Arbitration Provider Number Percent 
Specified 36 69.2 
  AAA  19  36.5 
  NAF  5  9.6 
  JAMS  2  3.8 
  NASD  2  3.8 
  Choice of two or more of above  6  11.5 
  NASD or NYSE  1  1.9 
  Other  1  1.9 
 Not specified 16 30.8 
2. Qualifications and Selection of Arbitrator 
Eight of the fifty-two clauses (15.4%) specify the arbitrators’ qualifications.  
These clauses require that the arbitrators be retired judges or practicing law-
yers, often with a stated minimum number of years of experience in law gener-
ally or in the area of law governing the dispute.  Fourteen of the fifty-two 
clauses (26.9%) explain how the arbitrators will be selected.  All but one 
provide that the consumer and the business each will select an arbitrator and 
that these two arbitrators will select a third, with almost half of these providing 
that a judge of a court that would have had jurisdiction over the dispute in the 
absence of the arbitration clause will choose the third arbitrator if the selected 
two are unable to agree on a third.  The remaining clause provides for a single 
arbitrator to be selected by mutual agreement of the parties or, if this is not 
possible, by the selection rules of the stated arbitration provider. 
3.  Procedural Rules 
Seventeen of the clauses (32.7%) discuss discovery, and eleven (21.2%) dis-
cuss evidentiary standards.  In most instances, these clauses alert consumers 
that discovery may be limited and evidentiary standards may be relaxed by 
comparison to litigation.  Twelve of the clauses that address discovery convey 
that discovery may or will be limited.  Three state that no discovery will be 
allowed.  The remaining two specify that local discovery rules will apply.  Three 
of the clauses that address evidentiary issues state explicitly that neither federal 
nor state procedural or evidentiary rules will apply, and another two state that 
evidentiary standards in arbitration may be less rigorous than in court.  Three 
provide that either the Federal Rules of Evidence or state and local rules of 
evidence will apply.  The remaining three convey partial evidentiary guidelines 
for the arbitration—for example, by stating that the arbitrator may compel the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at the hearing. 
Thirteen of the clauses (25.0%) address whether arbitrators must issue writ-
ten opinions.  Three of these clauses specify that arbitrators will provide the 
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reasons for their decisions in writing, whereas four state that arbitrators will not 
do so.  Another five clauses state that arbitrators will provide a written opinion 
at the request of either party, and one states that arbitrators will do so at the 
request of the parties. 
Seven of the fifty-two clauses (13.5%) provide that at least some aspect of 
the arbitration will be confidential.  Three clauses preclude the parties from 
disclosing the existence, content, or result of the arbitration without the consent 
of all parties.  Two preclude discussions with outside parties—one regarding the 
arbitration proceedings and the other regarding the arbitration award.  Another 
two merely refer to “confidential arbitration.” 
None of the clauses restrict parties’ rights to representation at any stage of 
the arbitration process. 
The arbitrator and procedural rules are summarized in Table 6. 
 
TABLE 6: 
ARBITRATOR AND PROCEDURAL RULES 
 
 
Rules Regarding . . .  
Number of Clauses 
That Describe 
This Feature 
 
Percent 
 
Arbitrator qualifications 8 15.4 
Arbitrator selection 14 26.9 
Discovery 17 32.7 
Evidence 11 21.2 
Written decision 13 25.0 
Confidentiality 7 13.5 
 
D. Access to Arbitration 
Mandatory arbitration effectively closes the doors to the courthouse.  But 
because litigation is so expensive, many plaintiffs who are not formally barred 
from the courthouse find it virtually impossible to get through its doors.37  
Hence, for claims involving modest amounts of money, arbitration may have no 
greater tendency than court litigation to preclude access to justice.  Arbitration 
may, however, impose its own barriers and costs on consumers.  We therefore 
reviewed the collected clauses for indications of the degree to which consumers 
would find it logistically feasible and affordable to arbitrate their disputes. 
 
 37. There is extensive commentary on the barriers to court access imposed by delay and expense.  
See, e.g., MARK H. GITENSTEIN & ROBERT LITAN, BROOKINGS  INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING 
COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989). 
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1. Initiation of Arbitration 
All fifty-two clauses allow either the consumer or the business to initiate 
arbitration proceedings. 
2. Location of Hearings 
Twenty-six of the clauses (50.0%) specify where the arbitration hearings 
would be held.  In all but three cases, that location was near the consumer’s 
residence or where the consumer receives service.  Two of the exceptions were 
on-line businesses: one states that California Joe would have to go to Seattle, 
Washington, to arbitrate his case; the other would send him to Baltimore, 
Maryland.  The other exception was a tour operator that requires that the arbi-
tration take place in San Diego, California. 
3. Fees and Other Expenses 
Thirty of the fifty-two clauses (57.7%) specify, to some extent, how the 
expenses of arbitration would be divided between the parties.  These clauses 
offer a plethora of allocation rules.  The most common overarching rule (found 
in thirteen of the thirty clauses that mention expenses) is that the parties will 
divide the expenses of arbitration equally.38  Two additional clauses state that 
the losing party will be responsible for all expenses of the prevailing party, and 
another states the same but makes responsibility conditional on the arbitrators’ 
deeming that such an award would not cause a substantial injustice.  One clause 
mentions only that the non-fee portions of the arbitration expenses will be 
borne equally between the parties.  The thirteen remaining clauses that address 
expenses refer to arbitration fees only.  Three of these provide that the party 
initiating the arbitration will pay the filing fee, and one provides that the party 
initiating the arbitration will pay all arbitration fees.  Two state that the 
arbitrator will decide who is responsible for the arbitration fees.  Four clauses 
provide for the possibility of some reimbursement of fees by the business to the 
consumer after the arbitration.  One states that the prevailing party may 
recover the arbitration fees from the losing party, and another implies this by 
limiting the consumer’s liability to the amount of fees that would have been 
paid in court.  The remaining clause limits the consumer’s liability for 
arbitration fees to $25 for claims of less than $1,000. 
Twelve clauses (23.1%) make some provision for aiding consumers who 
request assistance in paying filing, administrative, and hearing fees.  Seven of 
these clauses state that the business will advance, or consider advancing, all or 
some portion of the fees, to be reimbursed after the arbitration.  Two clauses 
state that the business will pay all or a portion of the fees and arbitrator 
expenses in cases of extreme financial hardship (presumably with the business 
deciding what constitutes “extreme financial hardship”).  Three clauses state 
that the business will pay at least some portion of the consumer’s expenses.  
 
 38. One of these allows arbitrator discretion, stating that the costs of arbitration will be split 
equally between the parties unless the arbitrator allocates them differently. 
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One of these provides for the business to pay up to $250 toward the filing, 
administrative, and hearing fees once the consumer has paid the first $50 of the 
filing fee.  Another states that the business will pay all provider fees, up to 
$2,500, for claims asserted by the consumer, after the consumer has paid an 
amount equivalent to the filing fee for such claims in the court in the con-
sumer’s judicial district.  Beyond $2,500, the business will consider paying addi-
tional provider fees, and if it does not approve the consumer’s request, and the 
consumer prevails, the business will reimburse the consumer for the additional 
fees.  The final clause states that the business will pay the portion of the filing 
fee that exceeds $50 and any administrative and hearing fees on any claim sub-
mitted by the consumer—up to a maximum of $1,500—and will consider paying 
any additional provider fees. 
The expense provisions are summarized in Table 7. 
 
TABLE 7: 
ARBITRATION EXPENSES MENTIONED IN CLAUSE 
 
 Number of Clauses  
Percentage  
Mention of expenses 30 57.7
All expenses 16 30.8
Divided equally, with arbitrator discretion 13 25.0
Loser pays 3 5.8
Partial expenses 14 26.9
Non-fee expenses divided equally 1 1.9
Initiator pays filing fee 3 5.8
Initiator pays all arbitration fees 1 1.9
Arbitrator decides fee allocation 2 3.8
Provision for some consumer reimbursement 
of fees 
4 7.7
Loser pays some or all fees 2 3.8
Cap consumer’s portion of fees 1 1.9
Provide for indigency 12 23.1
No mention of expenses 22 42.3
E. Remedies 
1. Limitations on Damages 
Four of the fifty-two clauses (7.7%) explicitly limit consumers’ substantive 
rights by placing limits on damages.  A health provider’s contract states that if 
the damages claimed by the consumer are less than $200,000, the arbitrator will 
have no jurisdiction to award more than that.  A clause in a tour operator’s con-
tract provides that under no circumstances will the business be liable to any trip 
participant for more than $500.  An auto insurer’s contract states that no non-
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economic or punitive damages will be awarded.  And another auto insurer’s 
contract states that arbitrators may not award damages in excess of the 
coverage limits. 
2. Availability of Review 
Twenty-one of the clauses (40.4%) explicitly state that arbitrators’ decisions 
may not be challenged in court.39  Another nineteen clauses (36.5%) merely 
refer to arbitration awards as “final” or “binding,” or to the arbitration itself as 
“binding.”  The remaining twelve clauses (23.1%) omit any reference to the 
finality of the arbitration. 
Generally, no opportunity for review or appeal is provided for within the 
arbitration process.  However, five of the credit card clauses provide that, in the 
event of an award greater than $100,000, either party may appeal to a panel of 
three arbitrators, who will hear the dispute de novo. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Critics of arbitration pursuant to predispute contracts between consumers 
and businesses have questioned whether arbitration provides the same substan-
tive remedies and procedural protections as would be accorded by a court.40  
The consumer arbitration clauses we reviewed offer mixed evidence with regard 
to these concerns. 
Few of the fifty-two clauses reflect the type of egregious self-dealing that has 
been identified in publicized cases.  Most of the clauses appear in many respects 
to put consumers on equal terms with the businesses that drafted them, a key 
feature if businesses are to defend successfully against claims of unconscion-
ability.  Arbitration is available at either party’s request and is held (almost 
always) at a location convenient to the consumer and the business.  Either party 
may be represented by counsel.  Either party may pursue specified means of 
provisional relief.  When small claims and other types of actions are exempted 
from arbitration, they are exempted (almost always) for both the consumer and 
the business.  Discovery is limited for both parties, and the rules of evidence are 
relaxed for both parties.  Expenses often are split equally between consumers 
and businesses.  The vast majority of clauses place no limits on substantive 
remedies.  And the arbitrator’s decision is equally binding on both parties.  
These terms suggest prima facie that businesses are placing consumers on equal 
footing with themselves in resolving any future disputes. 
A closer look at the clauses sampled, however, suggests that there are 
grounds for concern.  For example, if consumers challenge business practices, 
limitations on discovery will disadvantage them more than the businesses, as the 
 
 39. Four of these refer to possible exceptions under the Federal Arbitration Act and state law, 
without explaining what those exceptions might be. 
 40. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Pref-
erence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996). 
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businesses will hold most of the relevant information.  If filing, administrative, 
and hearing fees add significantly to transaction costs, this burden will fall dis-
proportionately on the (ordinarily less financially able) consumer, even when 
such fees are split equally.  Class actions, which are almost exclusively used by 
consumers against businesses, are often precluded.41  The nature of the interim 
relief provided for is more suited to the business than the consumer.  And the 
types of claims exempted from arbitration tend to be those brought by busi-
nesses against consumers.  In sum, the appearance of a level playing field 
between the parties may be deceptive. 
Moreover, this study provides little basis for believing that consumers are 
making informed decisions when they “agree” to arbitrate in predispute arbitra-
tion clauses.  More than a third of the clauses obtained fail to inform consumers 
that they are waiving their right to litigate disputes in court.  A fifth of the 
clauses do not explicitly state that the outcome of arbitration is final and bind-
ing.  More than a third do not provide consumers with any information regard-
ing the expenses they should expect to incur in an arbitration proceeding.  
Many clauses are silent on key aspects of arbitration, such as arbitrator qualifi-
cations and selection or the rules of discovery and evidence.  And almost a third 
of clauses fail to state what organization will provide the arbitration.  Moreover, 
to be fully informed of the features of the arbitration to which they are “agree-
ing,” consumers would need to review the applicable provider rules, a daunting 
task (made impossible when the arbitration provider is not named in the 
clause). 
The Supreme Court has stated that arbitration “is a matter of consent, not 
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements 
as they see fit.”42  This view is not supported by the results of the present study.  
Given the lack of information available to consumers in predispute arbitration 
clauses, and the difficulty of obtaining and deciphering these clauses, it is likely 
that most consumers only become aware of what rights they retain and what 
 
 41. The concern with class action preclusion is illustrated in Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002).  According to the California Court of Appeals, 
Although styled as a mutual prohibition on representative or class actions, it is difficult to 
envision the circumstances under which [a class action preclusion] provision might negatively 
impact [the business], because credit card companies typically do not sue their customers in 
class action lawsuits.  This provision is clearly meant to prevent customers, such as Szetela and 
those he seeks to represent, from seeking redress for relatively small amounts of money, such 
as the $29 sought by Szetela.  Fully aware that few customers will go to the time and trouble of 
suing in small claims court, Discover has instead sought to create for itself virtual immunity 
from class or representative actions despite their potential merit, while suffering no similar 
detriment to its own rights. 
Id.  This excerpt also conveys the more general concern that terms that appear facially neutral, avoiding 
claims of unconscionability, may, in reality, gravely disadvantage the consumer. 
Class action preclusion also occurs in provider rules.  The NAF, for example, has marketed its serv-
ices to businesses as a means of eliminating class actions and improving businesses’ bottom lines.  See 
Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: ‘You Can’t Sue Us”; Arbitration Clauses Block Consumers 
from Taking Companies to Court, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at A1. 
 42. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989). 
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rights they have waived after disputes arise.43  Moreover, given the frequency 
with which these clauses are used in some industries, consumers are often in a 
poor position to negotiate terms or seek services or products from other busi-
nesses.  The prevalence of arbitration rules that subtly or more strongly tilt the 
playing field in the business’s favor provides grounds for concern about how 
consumers actually fare in arbitration.  In summary, the evidence to date sug-
gests that there is little reason to believe consumer arbitration is—in the conjec-
ture of the Court—only another forum.44 
 
 
 43. One potential explanation for the lack of arbitration clauses by medical providers in the study 
is that California law requires arbitration clauses concerning medical malpractice to be more elaborate, 
explicit, and salient than arbitration clauses generally.  See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. 
Rptr. 611 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(a)-(b)). 
 44. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
